The Atlantic: Why Predictions of Ukraine's Quick Defeat Did Not Come True.

Erroneous Expert Predictions Regarding the War in Ukraine

The Atlantic published an article revealing how leading defense experts got it wrong in their assessments of the situation in Ukraine on the eve and at the beginning of Russia's invasion in February 2022.

The authors of this article - Eliot A. Cohen and Phillips Payson O'Brien, both military historians with government experience. They analyzed various sources to determine why authoritative analysts were so wrong in their predictions.

According to Cohen and O'Brien, most experts confidently predicted a quick Russian victory over Ukraine within a few weeks. These pessimistic forecasts turned out to be incorrect, but they still influenced the excessive caution of the US and its allies in providing aid to Ukraine.

The authors highlight several factors that led to such erroneous assessments:

• Excessive confidence of experts in their forecasts, without considering possible uncertainties.
• Overestimation of the modernization and professionalization of the Russian army.
• Underestimation of the combat skills and capabilities of Ukrainian military.
• Limited understanding of the changes that took place in Ukraine after 2014.
• Narrow specialization of most analysts on Russian military affairs without a deep understanding of Ukraine.

Cohen and O'Brien emphasize that the same experts who were wrong at the beginning of the war continue to dominate public and government discourse, often dampening Ukraine's chances and opposing support for it in the form of various types of weapons.

The authors call for greater diversity of expert opinions, especially in moments of crisis, and stress the importance of critical thinking when using expert assessments. They also emphasize the need for intellectual humility in the academic world and military analysis.