The U.S. Supreme Court Decides the Fate of Religious Rights of Prisoners.

According to Vox: It is hard to imagine a more obvious violation of federal law than what happened to Damon Landor.

Landor is a Rastafarian who does not cut his hair as part of his religious practice. During a five-month prison sentence for drug offenses, Louisiana prison staff handcuffed him, strapped him to a chair, and cut his hair. This happened despite Landor providing a copy of a federal court ruling that affirmed his right to maintain long hair while incarcerated under the Religious Freedom Act.

During the hearings in Landor's case, known as Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, it became clear that likely five or even six justices would express their position against Landor.

The crux of the matter is that the Supreme Court is not considering whether the prison staff violated the law on religious rights, but whether Landor has the right to sue the officials for the harm done and receive monetary compensation. While the Republican majority on the Supreme Court usually supports plaintiffs who complain about violations of their religious rights, additional complexities arise here.

The first question concerns whether individuals harmed by law enforcement can sue those officers. The Republican majority of the Court often exhibits skepticism regarding such lawsuits and has effectively closed off the ability to sue federal law enforcement for financial damages. Although the Landor case involves state prison officials, the underlying question is whether law enforcement should be held personally accountable for rights violations.

The second question relates to the fact that the case involves a federal funding program. The RLUIPA law requires state prisons receiving federal funds to adhere to certain religious freedoms of inmates. Congress has quite broad powers to demand that states receiving federal grants comply with conditions attached to those grants. However, the Republican majority of the Court recently made it clear that it aims to limit these powers.

Thus, it is quite possible that Republican justices will prefer to protect law enforcement or limit Congress's powers rather than uphold Landor's religious rights. Depending on how far the Court moves in limiting federal power, this could have serious consequences for many others, including Medicaid patients.

Why did the justices agree to hear this case?

Now that Landor's case seems doomed, the main question is why the Supreme Court decided to hear it.

While it is clear that Landor's rights were violated, federal appellate courts have shown little sympathy for prisoners in similar situations. As Judge Neil Gorsuch noted, nine such courts have considered whether inmates whose rights under RLUIPA or similar laws have been violated can sue wrongdoers and receive compensation, and all nine courts concluded they could not.

The issue lies in the archaic distinction made by the Supreme Court between federal laws that directly regulate individuals and laws that impose conditions on grants to states. The Supreme Court in Printz v. United States (1997) noted that 'the framers of the Constitution clearly chose a Constitution that empowers Congress to regulate individuals, not states.' In other words, Congress can prohibit a person from acting in a certain way but cannot command state governments.

However, Congress can bypass this limitation by imposing conditions on federal grants. In South Dakota v. Dole (1987), the Court concluded that Congress could require federal highway fund recipients to raise the legal drinking age to 21, although it could not compel states to change their drinking laws.

Federal appellate courts that ruled against individuals like Landor concluded that a contract between the federal government and the state only obligates those two parties and does not create obligations for third parties, such as prison staff. As one court stated, 'RLUIPA cannot impose direct liability on defendants who were not parties to the contract between [the state] and the federal government.'

All of the Court's Republicans appear to find this reasoning convincing. While Justice Amy Coney Barrett asked some questions that expressed sympathy for Landor, describing his treatment in prison as 'cruel,' Chief Justice John Roberts summarized the position, which, it seems, is common to the majority of the Court, stating that 'the basis for government liability here is the agreement with the federal government... but there was no such agreement with the prison officials whom Landor is suing.'

Given the consensus among lower courts and the apparent support for that consensus among most justices, it is surprising that the Court decided to hear this case. Typically, the Court does not intervene in legal questions on which lower courts agree unless it seeks to change the law. The facts of Landor's case are so shocking that there is politically no reason for the justices to hear this case if they just want to affirm existing law. Why not wait for a less outrageous case to arise?

Based on the oral arguments, a likely answer to this question emerges.

Republican justices may want to use Landor to redistribute the balance of power between Congress and the states

RLUIPA is not the only law that imposes conditions on states receiving federal funding. The largest federal program doing this is Medicaid, which imposes a series of conditions on states that receive federal funds to provide medical assistance to the poorest residents.

Two years ago, in Health and Hospital Corporation v. Talevski (2023), the Court upheld at least two decades of precedents broadly interpreting when Congress can allow individual Medicaid patients to file lawsuits to enforce those conditions. According to Talevski, provisions of the federal Medicaid law can be enforced through private lawsuits, provided the language of that provision is 'phrased in terms of individuals who benefit.'

However, last term, in Medina v. Planned Parenthood (2025), Republican justices appeared to move away from the principles set out in Talevski. Most of Justice Neil Gorsuch's statements in Medina are difficult to interpret and do not articulate any clearly defined new legal rule, but it is evident that he intends to impose new limitations on Congress's authority to impose conditions on federal funding programs.

The Medicaid law regulates a wide range of patient rights, from residents of nursing homes not being subjected to medication to the right to choose their doctor. Therefore, if the Court decides to limit Medicaid patients' ability to enforce their rights under federal law, it could have serious consequences for those patients.

During the hearings in Landor, three Democratic justices, particularly Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, author of Talevski, expressed concern that a ruling against Landor could undermine Talevski. And perhaps the six Republican justices are interested in Landor because they want this undermining to continue.

Gorsuch, in the meantime, offers some insight into what he wants to see as the new regime. For example, he asked whether coaches in federally funded universities could be held accountable if they have a policy regarding transgender athletes that Congress disagrees with. Or, what happens if Congress wants to hold state agency employees accountable for conducting abortions. Would that be permissible?

Under current law, a coach could be held liable. While existing law requires that conditions imposed on federal grants align with the purposes of that grant, a federal grant related to university athletic programs could include a condition regarding transgender athletes. But Gorsuch and his fellow Republicans seem to view this situation as untenable.

Liberals might point out that Gorsuch does not want Congress to have the ability to actually prohibit transgender athletes from sports or to prevent state employees from conducting abortions. But the hypothetical laws Gorsuch referred to during oral arguments in Landor do not actually exist. Instead, both RLUIPA and Medicaid are very real legislations.

It seems that the majority of the Court is eager to impose restrictions on both of these laws.